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1) INTRODUCTION 
The Councjl invitedthe Commission to present it with  proposals to resolve the bananas 
dispute by 31st May,  having consulted with  all  the  parties  principally concerned.  The· 
purpose of this paper is  to report on  these consultations and to propose possible courses· 
of action. 
This  consultation  took  place  against  the  background  that  the  panel  suggested 4 
possible ways of bringing the Community regime into conformity with the W.T.O. 
(l)  A flat tariff with a preference for the ACP granted on the basis of a waiver or 
in the framework of a Free Trade Agreement. 
(2)  ~flat tariff with a tariff quota for the ACP;covered by" a suitable waiver". 
(3)  A tariff quota, as at present, with duty free treatment of ACP imports. (This 
option appears to be the same as the W.T.O. consistent counterfactual  used 
by the arbitrators to calculate the  level-of nullification or impairment in  the 
U.S.  ar~itration). 
(4)  An  MFN quota combined with  a  tariff quota to the  ACP (i.e.,  the present 
system  on -the  panel's  interpretation  of  the  857,700  tonnes- ACP  tariff 
preference as  a tariff quota).  For this option, the panel say,  an  Article XHI 
waiver would be needed. 
2) POSITIONS OF PARTIES PRINCIPALLY CONCERNI<:i>'  ·.' · ' 
Consultations have taken  place with  the  US  mid  the  four  "principal-suppliers" (Costa 
Ric<l,  Colombia,  Ecuador  and  Panama). and- the  ACP.  Various  representatives·  of 
Community producers have also made their views known: 
The :key  conclusions of these consultations are as follows:-
_(a)  The US can conceive of three.possible outcomes: 
(1)  The regime remains unchanged and the US  maintains its sanctions. 
(2)  The regime is changed in 'ways which meet the key concerns or the 
US  companies. The key concerns of the companies arc that, if the tariff quota is 
continued, it should be enlarged and that they should have what they view as their "correct': share of the licences. The US  has suggested that this could be achieved 
by distribution of import licences on the basis of a pre  l993.reference period.  If. 
all these concerns were met then even an  Article XIII waiver might not be out of 
the question. 
(3)  The regime is changed in  such a way as to  be indisputably WTO 
consistent on the basis of the existing waiver.  In  that case the US will remove the 
sanctions,  hut  they  insist  on  the  right  to  reach  their  own  view  on  whether  a 
solution  which  did  not  meet  the  concerns of the  US  companies  is  truly  WTO 
compatible. If we did not agree with their views, we would have to start a panel 
against  the  sanctions  in  which  we  would  have  to  demonstrate  the  WTQ 
conformity of our new regime. 
(b)  Ecuador can agree to support continuation of our protection for the ACP, 
even  if an  Article  XIII  waiver is  needed,  provided we  meet  her key concerns, 
which  arc  principally  that  there  should  he  no  distribution  of .the  tariff quota 
between  principal  suppliers and  that  licences should be distributed to a  revised 
definition of operator ("shipper importers" i.e. the old "primary importer") on the 
basis of a 1994 - 1996 reference period. 
(c)  Costa Rica and Colombia are attached to a distribution of the tariff quota 
between principal suppliers which they consider to be their right inscribed in  the 
EC Schedule. They, therefore, regret that we did not appeal the panel conclusions 
that this can only he done in  agreement with  all  four principal  suppliers, which 
they believe to be legally wrong. They also remain attached to measures linked to 
distribution of  the  tariff quota,  designed to  enable them  to  obtain  a  reasonable 
share  of the  quota rent.  If  these  concerns  are  not  met  then  they  wi II  look  for 
compensation  for  loss of the  value of having the tariff quota shared out and/or 
oppose solutions which protect ACP interests but not theirs. 
(d)  It's  clear  that  the  four  principal  suppliers  could  not  agree  on  the 
distribution  of the  tariff  quota,  because  of the  opposition  to  distribution  by 
Ecuador.  Panama .has also not shown any readiness to =agree  a distribution of the 
tariff quota. 
(e)  The ACP are strongly attached to the protection afforded to them by the 
present and previous regime in fulfilment of the obligations of the Community, in 
particular under the  Lome Convention,  Protocol  n.  5.  They warn  of the  grave 
damage which would be done their economies, especially the economies of those 
of them who are most heavily dependent on bananas as a source of employment 
and foreign exchange, if they could no longer sell to the Community. They insist 
that aid cannot replace trade and that a solution on  the  line of opinion 3 of the 
panel  (counterfactual)  would  be  in  conformity  with  what  is  "required"  by  the 
Lome Convention. 
(f)  Community  producers  arc  not  directly  affected  by  the  panel  rulings, 
because these rulings do not criticise the internal regime. They arc, however, very 
conscious  of the  effect  a  change  in  the  external  regime  could  have  on  their 
position in the market. 
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3) !BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS . 
The Community regime provides support for  the Community's producers  by  way of a 
payment calculated  on  the  basis  of the  difference  between  prices  on  the  Community 
market and a reference price (i.e. by a form of deficiency payment). The external regime, 
.which is based on a tariff quota plus a volume limited preference for the traditional ACP 
bananas  (which,  as  the  arbitrators  noted  is  not,  in  fact,  restrictive  because  available 
supplies are  less than this  limit) serves effectively to  regulate prices on  the Community 
market and hence limits expenditure on the deficiency payment regime. The implications 
of solutions which reduced the effective level  of market protection and hence  led  to  a 
reduction in Community market prices arc set out in. Annex I. 
It  should be noted that the  new  inter institutional  agreement following the decisions of 
the Berlin summit set very tight  li~its on  FEOGA spending and made no provision for 
any increase in expenditure in the year 2000 on this or any otherCAP regime beyond the 
latest .forecast of expenditure. Indeed the  limit for the year 2000 was somewhat below 
total forecast expenditure. So any proposal which would lead to additional expenditure, 
would have to be accompanied by proposals to finance the additional expenditure by cuts 
elsewhere or by a proposal to cut the level of the reference price by an equivalent amount 
to the anticipated fall  in  prices. 
4) OPTIONS 
a) Tariff only, varhmt N. I 
Remove the tariff quota and leave the· ACP only with a tariff preference of75 Euro. This 
solution is not one which is sought by any of the complainants but, w  long as. the existing 
waiver continues,  is  certainly WTO compati~lc and  should,  therefore,  lead  the  US  to 
remove their sanctions. The cost in  terms or the Community's own deficiency payment 
scheme is estimated in  Annex I. As regards the ACP, they would lose both in  terms of 
export volumes and selling prices for their bananas. 
b) Tariff only, variant N. 2 
Remove the tariff quota and, through  an  Article XXVIII negotiation,  fix  the tariff to a 
level which approximates the price effects of the tariff quota·.  For details see Annex II.  .  '  . 
The cost in  terms of the Community's own deficiency payment scheme is  estimated in 
Annex I. 
Assuming that the  ACP were. given  duty  free  access  and  the  correct  level  of tariff is 
determined, such a splution could protect their interests, although they (like Community 
producers) could suffer as an  indirect consequence of the loss of the quota rent currently 
being  enjoyed  by  operators  who  deal  in  Latin  American  as  well  as  ACP  bananas. 
Moreover,  such  a  solution  would  have  a  negative  impact on  the·  US  companies  who 
pressed the US  to take the WTO action but it would be difficult for the US  to contest the 
WTO compatibility of the regime. The US  is  opposed to this option. because they insist 
on a level of tariff which would involve increase imports from  the dollar suppliers and 
hence  lower market prices.  But they have  indicated  a  willingness  to  consider a  tariff 
higher than  75  €  provided  this  condition  was  met.  It should  be  noted  that,  formally 
3· speaking, the US  does not have negotiating rights in  relation to the level of the tariff as 
they are not suppliers. 
c) Tariff only, variant N.3 
Move to a flat tariff with a low or zero tariff quota for the ACP. This solution is amongst 
the  alternatives  suggested  by  the  Ecuador  panel  but  appears  to  achieve  none  of the 
Community's objectives. 
c.J) Tariff quota with a tariff preference anc..l  unlimited access fur A(]• 
Retain a tariff quota and give the ACP a tariff preference or a zero tariff for an  unlimited 
volume , on the basis of Article  168 of the Lome Convention._  This option is the "WTO 
compatible counterfactual" used by the panellists in  their capacity as arbitrators in  order 
to assess the level of retaliation which the  US  should be authorised to impose. The US 
make it clear that they consider this option would require an  Article XIII waiver even if 
this is not the view of the panei.Similary, their opinion, shared in this case by the Panel, 
is that the option of keeping the ACP volume limited tariff preference requires an Article 
XIII waiver. Moreover, the US clearly expressed the opinion that this solution would not 
be acceptable for them,  since they would perceive it  as  paradoxical to  have a  solution 
which  would be  more favourable to the ACP than the one that was condemned by  the 
panel. 
The panel riotes that this option would not  produce any different economic-effects from 
those produced by the existing situation, given that traditional  ACP supplies have been 
running at levels below the theoretical maximum. The longer term effect, however, could 
be  to allow for an  increase in  the ACP (traditional and  non  traditional combined as  the 
two could no  longer be  distinguished) which  would  plainly  be  to  the  disadvantage of 
other  suppliers,  including  the  complainants,  although  production  capacity  in  ACP 
exporting countries is limited. 
e) Maintenance of the existing tariff regime on the basis of an Article XIII waiver 
This is the last option of those offered by the panel. Such a solution would (subject to the 
resolution of other problems in  the regime discussed below) assure WTO conformity and 
the maintenance of the regime's objectives. 
f)  Establishment of two tariff rate quotas 
An option not suggested by the panel but which might ensure WTO compatibility without 
the need for an .additional  waiver would be to establish a  new  tariff quota, outside the 
current tariff quota,  for  a  volume  higher than· current  ACP exports.  Within  this  new 
autonomous quota, the EC would establish a rate intermediate between the bound out of 
quota rate of 737 Euro/tonne and the  rate  of 75  Euro/tonne  which  applies  within  the 
WTO bound quota. 
Within  this tariff quota,  the  ACP would benefit  from  a  zero tariff.  A  key  problem  in 
applying this solution  is,  however, that of determining the  level  of tariff which  would 
apply to other suppliers. Too high and it could be judged to be prohibitive and hence, in 
the  light of the earlier jurisprudence of this case, a  volume limitation.  In  this case, the 
tariff quota would be seen simply as new (and larger) version of the 857 700 tonnes ACP 
quota which the last panel has said conflicts with  Article XIII.  Too low and all  but the 
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most competitive ACP would be displaced by  Latin  American  supplies. The US  didn't 
reject this possibility but under condition of a low tariff (they could start negotiations 150 
€/t) and an adequate volume oftonnes. 
g) AlB  the options so far considered have in common that they would ~tmount to attempts 
to achieve WTO compatibility without the assent of the complainants. 
The US has made clear that it  reserves the right to make its own.judgement on the WTO 
compatibility of the EC new regime. Their view is not necessarily the same· as that of the 
panel.  It  follows,  therefore,  that the  certainty of lifting of the  US  retaliatory  measures 
relies either on.  an  unambiguous WTO compatible solution  (H·  in  an  agreement with the 
US.  In  any other circumstance, we  would need to take a panel against the  US  sanctions, 
to  pro~'C that we were now in conformity (or, at least, that_ the US  was no longer suffering 
any loss due to any faiiings  in  our new  regime).  Arter three lost  panels, this possibility 
·.would certainly leaq to serious problems in terms of compatibility and public perception. 
h) The US have offered one more option, a flat tariff of 75 Euro completed by an aid 
to importers of bananas from the most vulnerable ACP (i'.e. the Caribbean) to provide 
sufficient incentive for them to continue to import at prices at which these countries can 
afford to produce. Such an option does not seem to be clearly WTO compatible, given the 
discrimination. in  the  import  conditions  would,  according  to  first  draft  estimations, 
involve expenditure of around €  160m on the Commu~ity regimes as well as the cost of 
the subsidy to importers of Caribbean bananas; and it leaves open the question of how the 
Community's. commitment the other .traditional  ACP suppliers would be  met.  It  would 
also do nothing to resolve the problems of non  traditional  ACP producers and it would 
leave the ACP.dependent on  EC financial  support, which is  not  an  ppropriate long-term 
solution. 
5) QUOTA DISTRIBUTION 
If  any of the above options which require the maintenance of a tariff quota were chosen, 
then the problem of the GATS incompatibility found by the panel in the way the licences 
were distributed would need to  be resolved, as· would the incompatibility found in  the 
way the tariff quota is distributed between .main  suppliers. Taking the  latter point first, 
the reason why the tariff quota-is at present distributed between major suppliers at present 
. is that the Community wished to honour its WTO obligation to the framework agreement 
countries to make such a distribution. If the DSU determines that under WTO rules this 
obligation can :only .be fulfilled by agreement with all  four main suppliers-and if one or 
two 'of the four refuse, then one WTO obligation overrides the' other. This does not mean, 
. ·however, that we could simply walk away frc)m  this obligation. Pacta sunt servanda, But 
nor  can  we  implement  it  if  we  arc  prevented  by  other  from  doing  so.  The  only 
immediately possible means of reconciling this  dilemma is  ~o remain  ready to  make a 
quota distribution when and if the four can agree and,. in  the meantime, to suspend the 
distribution and allow free competition within the tariff 4uota. Compensation could also 
offer a way out. The positions of Ecuador and Panama on quota distribution, firm though 
they may be at present, are not necessarily immutable as they will obviously need to re-
examine where  their  best  interests  lay  when  they  saw  the  form  of WTO. compatible 
regime which the Community decid~s to adopt. . 
6) DISTRIBUTION OF IMI'ORT LICENCES 
5 As regards the distribution of import licences, if any of the above options which require 
the maintenance of a tariff quota were chosen, a system based on  the current traditional 
importers/newcomers would necessarily be confronted to two conflicting views:  the US, 
on  the  one  hand,  requires  a  distant  reference  period  (before  1993).  This  would  pose 
problems und~r Community law and, to judge from what is said in  the Ecuador panel, is 
probably no more WTO consistent than the present reference period. On the other hand, 
this solution would run directly counter to the key demand of Ecuador, which is that the 
reference period 1994- 96 be maintained. 
If  this  option  is  rejected,  then  one  of  the  alternative  means  of  licence  distribution 
suggested by the panel would need to be used. 
These were "first come first served" or auctioning. 
a) First come, first served : If "first come first served" is to be interpreted in  the sense of 
the ship race, with the licences going to the bananas or the ships first in  harbour at the 
beginning of each  licence  period,  then  it  would  appear to  pose  insuperable  technical 
difficulties in  view  of the  large number of pot1s  potentially involved.  It  would also be 
discriminatory  in  the  sense  that  companies  with  large  alternative  European  markets 
would be better able to cope with the uncertainties involved. An alternative form of "first 
come first served", sometimes called simultaneous examination is  used in  several EC 
tariff quotas. Experience has, however, shown that when this system is used when a large 
quota .rent is  involved, over-subscription tends to  rise exponentially.  One solution  that 
could be used to overcome the problem raised by simultaneous examination, would be a 
more  strict  defini~ion  of  the  operators  as  shipper/importers,  i.e.  as  those  who  are 
responsible for shipping and for clearing customs. 
This last alternative would meet in  principle Ecuador's demand. It would have the effect 
of increasing the  licences available to  US  companies and other importers, albeit at  the 
expense of former secondary importers and ripeners.  Using shipper/importers as a base· 
for licence distribution would however give rise to problems in  policing the reality and 
binding nature of shipping contracts presented in  pursuit of licence claim.  In  order to 
prevent speculative application, the period of validity of the licence could be shortened 
and stiff penalties introduced for those not using the licences. 
b)Auctioning : Some regard auctioning import licences as  involving a  breach of tariff 
bindings because the price paid in  the auction is seen as an  additional import charge (see 
annex III). This is not the panel's view. Moreover, there are means of designing auction 
systems which make it clear that it is used only as a means of distributing licences and 
not as means of imposing a charge. This system would have as a clear advantage of being 
transparent  and  WTO  compatible.  The  Commission,  in  its  contacts,  noted  a  certain 
resistance to this option from the operators which seems shared by the USTR. 
6 7) CoNCLUSION 
. It  is clear that there is no solution which is guaranteed to solve the dispute which docs not 
involve major difficulties in  relation to the Community's own interests, hudget resources 
and obligations. It is also clear that the Community will have to put forward its solution if 
it  wants to  avoid an indefinite continuation of the  US  sanctions,  possibly followed  by 
more retaliation by Ecuador. The Commission would find a continuation of the sanctions 
inappropriate in view of the damage they do to European industry but also because of the 
wider implications this would have on our WTO obligations. Article 22 (8) of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding requires these measures to be temporary. 
At  the  moment,  the first  solution  which  would  guarantee  immediate  li l"ring  of  the 
sanctions and an  end to the  WTO disputes would  be  a  tariff only system as  described 
under paragraph 4  a;  this option however would involve major costs to  the budget and 
·ACP trade would become largely uncompctitive as a result. The second solution which 
would have  the  same desirable effect of ending the  disputes  and  lifting the  sanctions 
would be  a  system agreed with all  the  major players.  However, it has so far not been 
possible to pursue this avenue successfully given the lack of flexibility on the US  side 
concerning the distribution of licences. 
The  options  which  would  seem capable of resolving  the  dispute  and  respecting  the 
Communities'  key  budget  concerns  and  internal  commitments  to  its  own  producers· 
would be: 
1.  Moving to a high flat tariff (Option b) 
The disadvantages of that option are its uncertain budgetary effects, and the uncertainty 
of its effects on trade from  the weaker ACP suppliers; it  would· require Article XXVIII 
GATT negotiations (deconsolidation ofbound tariffs; sec annex  II)  and if compensation 
were  payable  to  Latin  American  suppliers,  it  is  not  clear how  this  would  be  found. 
Depending on the level of duty which in  the light of foregoing w~mld be very difficult to 
establish, this option is also likely to involve a cost for consumers. In  principle, the  US 
would have difficulty rejecting this option, although whcther·or not they would remove 
their sanctions without a panel, would depend on their assessment of.thc tariff level. This 
option would not require a licensing system or a new·waiver. 
2.  Removing the  limit  on  the  ACP  preferences  and· maintaini·ng  the  (other)  two 
existing tariff rate quotas (Option d) 
This option  should have no immediate budgetary impact and  would clearly safeguard 
ACP trade. The Ecuado: panel  considers  it  WTO consistent but the  US  claim  that it 
would require an  Article XIII  waiver and that they would not accept it.  Hence a  panel 
would probably be necessary to remove the US sanctions. 
This option would of course require a  system of licence distribution and the·  p~lncl has 
said that auctioning is WTO consistent. 
.  . 
lf under this option, the ACP trade expanded significantly, market prices could fall_  in the 
Community  and  budgetary  consequences  would  ensue;  at  that  point  an  Article  XIII 
waiver could be requested in order to reimpose a limit on ACP imports. 
7 3.  Introduction of a new tariffrate quota (Option f) 
Depending on the level of the duty in this new autonomous tariff rate quota  for a volume 
higher than the current ACP entitlements, there could be no budgetary consequences and 
ACP trade  should be ensured.  The  US  do  not contest  this  possibility as  being  WTO 
consistent in theory, but would do so if they considered the level of the in  quota tariff  so 
high  as  to  be  prohibitive  for  Latin  Anicrican  bananas.  In  that  case,  a  panel  might  be 
necessary to remove the US sanctions. 
Under this  option too,  auctioning could be  used  to  distribute the  licences  but separate 
auctions would be required for the different tariff rate quotas given the different in-quota 
tariff rates. 
It is  the Commission's view  that a  choice must be  made among the  3  options set out 
above. The Commission therefore invites the Council to urgently giv~ its views on these 
options. 
In  the  meantime,  the  Commission continues to explore  all  avenues  to  reach  with  the 
complainants an agreed and WTO compatible solution, as quick as possible. 
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ANNEX I 
IMI'LICATIONS 01<' A TARIFF ONLY SYSTEM 
(I.E. WITHOUT QUANTITATIVI<~ RESTRICTIONS) 
Four scenarios  have  been  examined  on  the  hasis  of a  range  of assumptions.  Each 
assuming ACP access at 0 duty would he maintained and existing support for Community 
producers would be maintained: 
(i)  a single tariffof .  75 
(ii)  "  175 
(iii)  275 
(iiii)  "  375 
The following comments are in relation to the status quo. 
Scenario I (75 Euro/t) 
Market prices would fall  and co.nsumption would increase. However, ACP supplies from 
the  Caribbean  would  he  uncompetitive,  although  some  supplies  from  Africa  would 
continue. 
The cost of the domestic support regime would increase by  I  00-150 MEURO. 
Scenario II (175 Euro/t) 
Market  prices  would  fall  and .consumption  would  increase  ..  However,  ACP  supplies 
would still be less competitive and fewer bananas would arrive from such origins. 
The cost of domestic support regime would increase by  50-WO  MEURO. 
9 Scenario HI (275 Euro/t) 
Whilst the competitive position of individual ACP suppliers might vary, the overall price 
formation on the EU market would be similar to the present one. 
The cost of the domestic support regime would hroadly he similar to the present, with  a 
year to year risk of increased expenditure due to greater price volatility. 
Scenario IV (375 Euro/t) 
Market prices would increase and consumption would fall.  However, all  ACP suppliers 
would be competitive but the Latin-American share would fall. 
The cost of domestic support regime would decrease slightly. 
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ANNEX II 
UNBINDING OF THI<: CURRI•:NT TARIFFS FOR BANANAS 
Under tariff heading "08 03 00 12  Fresh bananas other than  plantains" the hound rate <if 
duty at the-conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations was Euros 850/t., to be reduced 
by the year 2000 to Euros 680/t.  A tariff rate quota of 2.2 mio./t. at Euros 75/t. was also 
bound;  and  subsequently  the  Community  opened  a- further  quota  at  Euros  75/t.  of 
353.000t.  Almost all MFN tr~de takes place within the reduced tariff  quota~. 
Should the Community wish to move to a "tariff only" system at a rate higher than Euros 
75/t., GATT Article XXVIII provides that such  modification shall  be notified to all  the 
GATT Contracting Parties, and consultations shall take place on request with Parties who 
are principal suppliers or have an  initial negotiating right (INR) as well as those having a 
substantial interest in  the product concerned.  Following negotiations and agreement with 
any  Party  with  which  such  concession  was·  originally  negotiated  and  any  other 
Contracting party having a "substantial interest" - usually considered as supplying 10% or 
more of the market - the tariff rate shall he rebound 
1 at the new rate.  The negoti~tions 
"which  may  include  provision  for  compensatory  adjustment  with  respect  to  other 
products"  are  aimed at  maintaining a  similar general  level  of reciprocal  and  mutually 
advantageous concessions to that existing before the negotiations. 
The implications of such negotiations in  the  banana case would depend on the level  at 
which the Community wished to rebind the  tariff.  If the objective were to remove the 
reduced duty quotas and replace the bound duty of over ~uros. 700/t with a tariff of, say, 
Euros 500/t., the principal suppliers (Equador, Panama, Costa Rica and Colombia) would 
be likely to seek compensation equal to the difference in  tariff perception between Euros 
500/t and Euros 75/t.  for  their average annual  sendings.  The problem with  this  is,  of 
course, that since all those principal suppliers benefit from GSP preferences, there are rio 
major products on which they pay duty at all;  so the scope for reductioJ1 scarcely exists. 
If on  the  other  hand  the  Community  sought ·h>  establish  a  new  binding of,  say,  275 
Euros/t., it could be  argued that the  replacement of a  prohibitive tariff of some Euros. 
700/t. with a tariff which permits trade to flow  freely would in  itself compensate for the 
elimination of the reduced tariff quotas. 
1 Since the URA, ali agricultural products have tob~·hound 
11 In  all  cases,  should  agreement  not  be  reached  with  the  principal  suppliers,  the 
Community retains its  right to unbind and rebind the product; in  that case, Contracting 
Parties having WTO rights shall be free to withuraw equivalent concessions. 
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ANNEX III 
OUTLINE (W TIU: OI'TIONS ON THE AUCTIONING OF BANANA IMI'ORT LIO:NCF.S 
·Auctioning of imp()Jt  licences is  a system to allocate licences.  It  is  not an extra 
charge  to  imports.  Auctioning  is  arguably  the  single  hcst  system  to  alloc'!tc 
licences  when  there  is  a  significant quota rent.  The other available  systems  to 
distribute  licences, such  as  first come/first served or simultaneous examination. 
have a  fundamental shortcoming which is  that the licences which arc granted arc 
only a  fraction  of what operators request, and therefore do not  facilitate  normal 
trade flows. 
Historically. based· licences  distribution  systems  have  another  fundamental 
shortcoming,  which  is  that  they  freeze  the  market,  they  reduce  competition 
between operators and they create vested interests.  In  the case of bananas, the 
criticisms of the panel  make it difficult if not impossible to devise a  system of 
historical based licence distribution which could be considered WTO compatible. 
In  addition;  the  fact  that  an  allocation  mechanism  can  he  considered  to  be 
discriminatory merely on  the basis of its  actuitl  impact will  make it  difficult to 
devise systems of administrative quota allocati()n  that meet the requirements of 
the  GATS.  For  instance,  according  to 'the  rulings  of  the  Appellate  Body,  a 
Member's allocation based on the past trade performance of the importers could 
be considered  to  be  discriminatory  if de fi.iclo  most  importers  with  past  trade 
performance arc owned or controlled by nationals of that Member (which seems 
likely in most cases). 
The only practicable quota allocation mechanism which ensures that importers of 
all  origins are given an equal opportunity to supply their services is  auctioning. 
(The only alternative mechanism that would also ensure equal treatment would be 
a lottery). 
There are two different auctioning systems, which could be operated. Both have 
in common the fact th<;tt they will allow a full  utilisation of the tariff rate quotas. 
The first option could work according to the following lines: 
The import licences on the tariff rate quota would be auctioned by lot of a 
given number of tonnes. The size of the lots could he either the same, or . 
one could have different lots with different sizes. 
Operators requesting import licences would bid a certain ·amount per lot. 
The  bids  would  then  be  ranked  starting  with  the· highest.  The  lots  for 
which the bids were made would be added up to reach the tariff rate quota 
volume.  All  the operators that were ranked as  having  made the highest · 
bids until the volume of the quota is  fulfilled would get the licences, and 
would pay the full amount of their bids. 
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..J The second option (called slliking price) would operate exactly in  the same way 
with one single difference, which would he that  all  the operators would only pay 
the minimum hid  in  the rank of all  those who were successful.  1\.  feature of the 
second system j·s that, in the event that the bids were for less than the total  volunw 
of licences on offer. the minimum price would, hy deri"nition, be zero. This makes 
it  totally transparent that the system is  only a means of distributing licences, not 
an additional import charge because the licences would all  be free so long as the 
total quantity was not oversubscribed. 
3.  With respect to access to auctioning, it could be open to all  interested operators. 
However, it could also be conceived that  access to auctioning he restricted to a 
well-defined category of operator, on  the  basis of objective non-discriminatory 
criteria - although  there  would  have  to  he  very  good  reasons  to  justify such 
limitations and there would always be the risk that they could be considered to he 
discriminatory. 
4.  With respect to the frequency of auctioning any reasonable period is conceivable, 
from a yearly to a monthly auction. 
5.  Separate auctioning seems appropriate for  separate in-quota rates.  If the banana 
import regime has two (or more) in-quota rates, operators should he allowed to  lodge 
separate bids  for  the  different  in-quota  rates.  To do  otherwise  would  discriminate  in 
favour or those who hid for the lower in quota rates. 
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